Category Archives: Principled Pluralism

The True Politician according to Max Weber

Here is H.H. Bruun, in his book Science, Values and Politics in Max Weber’s Methodology (1972) writing of how a true politician would conduct himself according to Weber:

…[T]he precondition which Weber establishes for action in conformity with the ethic of politics is the fundamental willingness to let oneself be guided in certain cases by the value axioms of other spheres than the political one. Only those who can have “Beruf zur Politik” who do not only have this “Beruf”, who in particular situations are able and willing to submit to other value systems.

This precondition again implies that the political ethic as defined by Weber does not only demand knowledge of the laws and regularities of the political sphere; in other words, the “true” politician must not only be aware of the teleological system
surrounding his political goal, but also of the axiological (value or ethical system) one.

But this awareness again destroys the possibility referred to above of a relative harmony inside the political sphere. The possibilities of axiological conflict which were in the first instance absorbed by the definition of power as an instrument of politics, are resuscitated by Weber’s demand that the politician should be aware of the relationship between political calculation of ends and means and those of the non-political value spheres.

Axiological value analysis becomes necessary to the politician. On the one hand, Weber’s description of the responsible ethic of conviction means a rejection of the pure ethic of conviction, where the axiological analysis is the only relevant one: the acceptance of the responsibility for the consequences of one’s actions demanded by the responsible ethic of conviction implies a knowledge of the consequences for which the responsibility is taken, i.e., a need for teleological value analysis.

A person committed to the responsible ethic of conviction, whether his actions be guided by the axioms of the political or of other value spheres, i.e., whether they be guided by the teleological or by the purely axiological considerations, should know the “cost” of these axioms (in the form of tensions arising in relation to other spheres).

He has to make it clear to himself what ethical (religious,aesthetic, etc.) norms he is violating by, for instance, declaring war in the name of (political) national interest; and conversely, he must know what political demands he neglects by refusing on (for instance) ethical grounds to declare war or to use force at all in the situation. Since he is a politician, it is natural to assume that his starting point is political, i.e., that he is striving to attain a supraindividual goal.

But even inside this chain of ends and means, he must constantly try to supplement the teleological relations, i.e., that he is not justified in assimilating the axiological  system to the teleological one;  this acknowledgment will force him to examine the intrinsic axiological value of the means, the side effects and the goal according to the value system or systems to which he also remains committed outside the political sphere; and finally, he must recognize that his knowledge cannot reach beyond a certain point: that the paradox of consequences attaches to both end and means.

Only after having elucidated all these points may he decide whether he can still accept working within the political sphere and submitting to its demands; only then can he take the responsibility for his decision and claim to have fulfilled the demands of the responsible ethic of conviction ( italics in the original, pp. 284-285)

Well, sounds like a Dooyeweerdian modal analysis of the intersection of the political with other spheres, right? (with some amendments because of sphere sovereignty)

*inset photo of Weber from this blog.

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Filed under Politics, Principled Pluralism, Public Interest, reformational philosophy, Sociology

Blasphemy, the “Christian state” and the Cross

After reading Douhat’s piece  in the New York Times on blasphemy,  I offer these further thoughts on #Charlie Hebdo in relation to blasphemy and its place in the Christian society:

1. A state inspired by Christian ideals will nevertheless allow room for blasphemy, for the right to offend, precisely as demonstration of God’s grace and Christian civility, of the conviction, to borrow from  Mouw and Griffioen, that while we await the eschaton, we live under an “open heaven” and cannot see what lies beyond the horizon. This calls then for a certain sense of humility and openness to critical dissent. This is the heart of the Cross as symbol, message, and historical reality.

2. A state founded on Christian principles will not criminally prosecute blasphemy. Such a state will have a good grasp of justice deepened by ethics; it will understand why the contemporary differentiation in society where various institutions have their respectively marked out spheres necessitates the separation of “religious offenses” from the jurisdiction of the state as a political institution.

3. This calls to mind Jim Skillen’s reworking of Bishop Newbiggin’s take on the Cross: Skillen, proceeding from Newbigin’s view of the cross, argues that Christians should be arguing that an open, non-totalitarian, religiously plural society cannot be grounded in intolerant secularism but is, in fact, grounded in God’s patience and mercy in upholding the creation.

4. What they need, according to him, is a strong and distinctive doctrine on which to anchor this robust view of political pluralism; they too, must realize that the fair treatment of all faiths –including the atheist faith – in the public arena should, as a matter of principle, be one aspect of a ”Christian society. “

5. This Protestant idea of “principled pluralism” (or also known by its older name as “sphere sovereignty”) holds that if the right thing for Christians to do in obedience to the truth of Christ’s cross and resurrection is to defend religious freedom in public, then they must not tolerate the power of political untruth that would deny religious freedom to non-Christians or to some other religious group.

6. For Skillen, this means pushing a normative political principle for a Christian society that is consistent with the gospel demand that Christians should make some room for untruth and not try to act as God at the final Judgment. “If the political principle consistent with this truth is that all citizens should be treated fairly and equitably in regard to their religious way of life, then the political principle of tolerance is a normative truth-consequence of the gospel.”

7. Of course, the truth of political fairness for all citizens excludes the untruth of political discrimination or persecution of one or another religious group. Thus, precisely in order to live and proclaim the truth of the gospel, Christians should be willing to lay down their lives even for religious enemies in order to defend the truth of equal public justice for those enemies.

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Spinoza, Charlie Hebdo and the Future of Religion in France?

charlie-hebdoIn light of the shocking and tragic events in Paris in the last few hours, a short essay by Jonathan Israeli from 8 years ago came to mind, on Baruch Spinoza’s secular tolerance on the question of freedom of thought versus the freedom of religion (as opposed to Locke’s more theological/religiously inspired idea of tolerance). According to Israel, Spinoza represents the heritage of the Radical Enlightenment, one that pushed religion to the fringes and restricted if not banished religion from public discourse.  In contrast, Locke was an heir to a more Protestant idea of toleration.  I believe France has been on Spinoza’s road for a long time now. It will go deeper into Spinoza’s territory after the Charlie Hebdo massacre. Some relevant excerpts:

In his later work, the Tractatus Politicus (1677), Spinoza does more extensively deal with liberty of conscience and worship but in a way which again shows that his foundational tolerantisme toleration not grounded in theology – refuses to allow special privileges to the protection of faith and is chiefly intended to ground individual freedom of opinion, as well as of speech and writing. At the same time, Spinoza, again quite unlike Locke, always evinced a marked disinclination to encourage organised ecclesiastical structures to expand in influence, compete for followers, and assert their spiritual authority over individuals, as well as engage in politics. He begins by distinguishing carefully between toleration of worship, strictly speaking, which is one thing and empowering religious groups to organize and extend their authority just as they wish which he sees as something rather different. While readily granting that everyone must possess the freedom to express their beliefs no matter what faith they profess, or what they believe, Spinoza simultaneously urges the need for restrictions on the activities of churches. While dissenters should have the right to build as many houses of worship as they want and individuals may freely fulfil the duties of their faith as they understand it, Spinoza does not agree that this means that minority religions should have a free hand to acquire large and impressive ecclesiastical buildings or exercise sway over their members, as the Amsterdam Portuguese synagogue had once sought to dictate to him. Large and magnificent houses of worship should, he thinks, be monopolized by a publicly endorsed religion supervised by the state which in any well-ordered society needs to be a ˜very simple, universal faith , that is one which teaches ordinary folk that salvation comes through practicing ˜justice and charity. True religion in his terminology is a symbolic or concretely articulated universal philosophical religion. What is absolutely disastrous for any society, he argues, is allow religious leaders of whatever kind sufficient autonomy and prestige to be able to mobilize elements of popular opinion to play an active role in the political process and challenge the authority of the state and its institutions.

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Poleteismo and Principled Pluralism

ImageThe Center for International Law (Centerlaw)  said yesterday the dismissal by the Office of the Ombudsman of administrative and criminal charges against artist Mideo Cruz and 10 Cultural Center of the Philippines officials over the controversial Kulo exhibit should help clarify for Filipinos the value of free expression in a society anchored on “principled pluralism.”

“Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales deserves recognition for  highlighting the importance of reasoned albeit impassioned discussion about the values that are important to our society,” said Centerlaw lawyers Harry Roque, Joel Butuyan and Romel Regalado Bagares, who represented Cruz and CCP Museum Division Head Karen Ocampo Flores in the proceedings.

The case arose from Cruz’s “Poleteismo” – a wall collage of conflicting and contradictory images of popular religiosity, politics and consumerism – that was shown in the Kulo exhibit at the  CCP in 2011 along with 31 other art works celebrating the national hero Jose Rizal’s 150thbirthday and the University of Sto. Tomas’s 400th founding anniversary.

The exhibit, which opened on June 17, 2011, was prematurely shutdown by CCP authorities because of the controversies generated by Cruz’s installation, which, among other things, juxtaposed religious iconography with phalluses and other discordant symbols and images.

The lawyers said a society that respects principled pluralism should be able to yield space to controversial opinions, because it is at the heart of democratic deliberation, where the majority opinion is not necessarily shared by everyone and should not mean it should be accepted by everyone even without the benefit of discussion.

According to them, principled pluralism seeks to do justice to diverse religions and points of view and keeps the public square open to people of all faiths and points of view.

They said in their statement:

“Art calls for a democratic solidarity even in the face of an intense confrontation of values and perspectives because ultimately, if art is to exist in a society that promotes democratic principles it must sometimes be allowed to express even those thoughts and ideas that may not sit well with what the majority believes to be within the limits of acceptability.”

“Solidarity expects that a majority sure of their convictions should be able to take it in the chin when their cherished beliefs are put to question by a counter-cultural dynamic; it expects that in the face of intense questioning the majority, since they are sure of their convictions and are secure in their cherished doctrines, will be able to hold up on their own and offer a counter-argument in a dialogical manner that shows both grace and civility.

“Of course, this kind of democratic commitment requires a basic appreciation for the variegated function of art in society. Such an appreciation should be able to distinguish between what is shown at a rundown affair in a seedy part of town operated by criminal types, and an exhibit– albeit controversial because of the questioning it subjects society’s conventions to – set up at a government-run museum or cultural center.”

According to the lawyers, the alternative to a state and a society founded on principled pluralism is a return to a Christendom where the Inquisition was the order of the day for those who dared to cast a different vision of societal order.

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