Doing long-haul diplomacy in Pinyin

Does the arbitral court’s discussion of kompetenz-kompetenz make sense?” W., a young female Chinese graduate student, softly asks me as we walk past Beijing’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs building under an afternoon drizzle recently.

Her question is at the heart of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s (PCA) jurisdiction over the South China Sea case filed by the Philippines, despite China’s objection.
“It’s the arbitral court’s competence to rule on its own competence to hear the dispute,” I answer, with a nod to Kelsen’s theory that international law springs from a grundnorm (fundamental norm). She obviously knows. She’s politely raising doubts over the PCA’s voiding of the “nine-dash line” claim.

Following an international law conference in Beijing in mid-October, W. shows Herbert Loja—a Pinoy PhD student at the Hong Kong University—and me around the city’s tourist spots.

Many young people now study international law in droves after the court’s ruling, says W., a student at the China University of Political Science and Law. Are Filipinos her age similarly driven? I wonder.

Conversant with Mao and Marx, she is tall and lively, and speaks English with a slight British accent, acquired by “listening to BBC broadcasts.” If her studies are an indication, her generation of students knows Western modes of thinking in international law, and the imperialist roots of the current purportedly rules-based international legal regime.
Earlier, over a lunch of bowls of steaming noodles in a trendy basement restaurant on Wangfujing street, we discussed a new book on theories of international law by a noted European scholar.

At the Asian Society of International Law conference hosted by Renmin University where Herbert and I read papers, scholars pondered the global shifts that had taken place since 2016. State sovereignty is back with a vengeance, said Society president Harry Roque. With the American retreat deep into national anxieties, emergent powers have freer rein to pursue their own vision of international relations in a multipolar world.

Cynicism is rife. Former colonies oppose universal rules with new vigor, saying such were made to favor former colonizers. The old logic of international law as might is right resonates with countries that should know better, precisely because, once upon a time, they were at its receiving end. But it pays to remember, argued professor Shinya Murase, that it was newly decolonized states (the Philippines included) that pushed the United Nations for equal human rights protection.

The drizzle is now a downpour, as we reach the gates of the colossal 18-hectare National Museum of China. Nearly half the size of our Mall of Asia, it’s a stone’s throw away from Tiananmen Square, scene of a massacre in 1989, when Chinese army tanks crushed a prodemocracy student protest. The carnage is forgotten while the museum runs a permanent exhibit, “The Road of Rejuvenation,” on the Western powers’ humiliation of China and its desire for vindication.

A beneficiary of the dividends of China’s huge investments in higher education, W. hopes to become a diplomat. For now, she volunteers for a Chinese NGO working among Syrian refugees in Turkey, and plans to get an internship at The Hague next year.
Though many Chinese universities now rank among the world’s best, few Filipinos think of Beijing as an education mecca. But we need to thoughtfully argue our rightful place as a nation, in a language that the Chinese understand very well—theirs.

If language is a door to a culture’s deepest thoughts, imagine Filipino legal scholars discussing fluently in Pinyin with their Chinese counterparts the finer points of China’s own Hobbesian realpolitik toward other states! In fact, we need more young Filipino scholars from all possible fields studying in the best Chinese universities.

There, they may yet win respect from China’s future leaders for the unfinished struggle for self-determination of Asia’s first republic.

Earlier published at : https://opinion.inquirer.net/117175/doing-long-haul-diplomacy-in-pinyin#ixzz5XYCO8xCN

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Green on Gardner on Law and Morality

Leslie Green continues his critique of his Oxford colleague John Gardner on the relation between law and morality. Here he engages Gardner’s point about the “inescapability of morality” in relation to law — that law is judged by morality, if law isn’t in some way, a moral norm by itself, or a “near natural law.”

The discussion echoes but couldn’t quite identify, the multi-aspectual view, where “positive law” in fact functions in all aspects of reality — it has a moral, social, economic, aesthetic, lingual or historical sides, and so on.As Alan Cameron, who edited the first volume of HD’s Encyclopedia of the Science of Law, put it to me recently, the process of law forming “is not merely the positivisation of a jural norm. It also requires the positivisation of analytical, lingual, social, economic and possibly aesthetic norms. An individual law has it own ‘individuality’ structure – it is some “thing” jurally qualified but displays all the modal aspects (subjectively and objectively).”

Thus a contract is not merely a legal document, it also has a social dimension, or functions in the social realm, as it has a certain history and an economic value (as the sociologists of law have been trying to show).

It should be interesting to note that in HD’s modal scale, the ethical (moral) aspect comes after the legal aspect. Law is prior and foundational to, and anticipates, morality. So there is some correspondence between HD’s and Gardner’s notion of morality, as the former in fact says that the ethical aspect deepens the legal aspect in the process of disclosure.

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Void ab initio: A legal history

“He who has real power is also capable of determining concepts and words,” wrote Nazi constitutional theorist Carl Schmitt. “Caesar dominus est supra grammaticam (Caesar is also the lord of grammar).”

Schmitt is studied not as a grammar Nazi but for the import of his most famous words in the very first line of his “Political Theology” (1922): “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.” A true sovereign wields unchecked power to name friends and enemies of the state.

Solicitor General Jose Calida may not have read Schmitt in law school, but his use of the Latin maxim void ab initio in Sen. Antonio Trillanes IV’s amnesty case is textbook Schmittian grammar. It is what the President says it is.

In 1941, the German Jewish émigré Ernst Fraenkel published in the United States his book, “The Dual State,” showing how the Nazis applied Schmitt’s ideas to seize control of German administrative and judicial bodies.

The legal scholar described two contrary features of Hitler’s government: There was the “normative state,” the formal constitutional norms for civil and political rights, and the “prerogative state,” with its arbitrary exercise of power. Fraenkel’s study shows the gradual surrender of the normative state to the prerogative state by German lawyers, legal scholars and judges after Hitler declared martial law on Feb. 28, 1933.

For one, German courts considered martial law a political act outside their jurisdiction. Schmitt argued that the grounds for martial rule in Article 48 of the Weimar constitution cannot limit the Führer’s own prerogatives. If the constitution provides but two grounds for martial law—rebellion or invasion—he may disregard it. Or he may hold that terrorists who lay siege to Berlin are committing rebellion, even if it means treating them as a political group, as long as he gets his martial law.

Hitler had argued that he is the societal order. Thus, he who opposes the president opposes law and justice. Yet many believed him. Every governmental action must align with the goals of National Socialism, a “religion without a god.”

In 1929, professor Carl Bilfinger wrote that international law is limited by reservations on national security. Schmitt agreed, saying the reservations are more important than the treaty. Both scholars would be fine with the Philippine withdrawal from the International Criminal Court as a sole executive prerogative.

There was only muted resistance to this system, like a lower court ruling that a composer is entitled to royalties for his music aired by radio stations, rejecting arguments that the stations — since they also aired Nazi propaganda — were exempt from royalty fees.
Otherwise, democratic institutions toed the line. Across Germany, the prerogative state reduced the rule of law to its arbitrary and irrational diktat.

Even civil servants were denied access by the courts to their own official records in disputes with their superiors (sounds familiar?). A 1935 decision of the Prussian Supreme Administrative Court abolished Article 129, Section 3 of the constitution guaranteeing the right, as it contradicted the Nazi “leadership principle.”

The Prussian Supreme Court also held that all religious activities must meet government regulations; if not, believers may be guilty of stoking “indirect Communist danger.”
In 1938, another court convicted a minister of breaching the peace for praying for prisoners held by the Nazis. Fraenkel noted how the highest court of Bavaria erased the fundamental principle of double jeopardy, punishing anew a man who had already served his sentence for “high treason.” The principle is merely procedural, it so held.

All eyes are now on the Makati City Regional Trial Court Branch 148, and the Supreme Court: Is ne bis in idem, as the principle is said in Latin, also void ab initio, as the President says?

By 1936, “the resistance of traditional law-enforcing bodies was weakened.” We all know what happened to German Jews — they lost their right to property, and their very own lives. For, by simply being born into a race not of their own choosing, they rendered their right to exist void ab initio.

This was first published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 3, 2018.

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Filed under Carl Schmitt, Ernst Fraenkel, Human Rights, Impunity, legal theory, martial law, Nazi War Crimes, political theology, Public Interest, Supreme Court

Dante as Proto-Kuyper?

In which Kantorowicz casts Dante as originator of a proto-sphere sovereignty idea that’s apparently non-Thomistic (though he worked within the same system).Also, analogical borrowing (concept-formation in the Dooyeweerd sense) from theologians by jurists to form a “political theology.”

 

 

So you see law coming to its own more and more.

 

 

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Filed under Aquinas, Kantorowicz, legal theory, political theology, reformational philosophy, Religion, secularization

PSIL Call for Papers

The Philippine Society of International Law has just posted a Call for Papers for its first National Conference this September. The PSIL National Conference is a prelude to the 7th Biennial Conference of the Asian Society of International Law, which it will host in Manila next year.

The PSIL has a distinguished lineage, having been founded in 1961 by the late Justice Florentino Feliciano.

This is the first time in so many years that a conference dedicated to international law in this scale will be mounted hereabouts.

Check out the PSIL Call for Papers post here.

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Tentative thoughts on International Humanitarian Law, the Marawi Siege and Lagman v. Medialdea

1. IHL prohibits acts of terrorism on the part of parties to an armed conflict.

2. Parties to an armed conflict are those of sufficient organization and structure as to be able to recognize and observe the laws and rules of war.

3. This goes for both international armed conflicts, where  of course, the parties are states so the question of organization is evidently met  (Fourth Geneva Convention) and non-international armed conflicts ( Two Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions), where usually, the parties are non-state actors ranged against the state, or non-state actors fighting one another. The Geneva Conventions are part of Philippine law by way of the Constitution’s treaty clause (as we are parties to them) and by way of the incorporation clause, as they also form part of customary international law.

4. In IHL, terrorism is not defined but acts designed to spread terror among the civilian populace in an armed conflict are tagged as “acts of terror” that are illegal and criminal in nature. In other words, there is a distinction made in IHL between status and act. A group may have the status of a party to an armed conflict, whether non-international or international and yet may be prosecuted for war crimes for engaging in  acts of terror.

5. Generally, IHL is not applied to groups that are considered no more than terrorist in nature.  IHL does not apply to the latter, as in the first place, it rejects the rules and laws of war.To date, the ICRC does not consider ISIS/ISL as a rebel group or as a state  fighting a transnational war (despite its claim that it is waging a war to establish a Caliphate in Iraq and Syria). A briefing paper of  the ICRC puts it thus:

With respect to the phenomenon of armed groups that are perceived as having a global reach, such as al-Qaeda or the Islamic State group, the ICRC does not share the view that an armed conflict of global dimensions is, or has been, taking place. This would require, in the first place, the existence of a ‘unitary’ non-State party opposing one or more States. Based on available facts, there are not sufficient elements to consider the al-Qaeda ‘core’ and its associated groups in other parts of the world as one and the same party within the meaning of IHL. The same reasoning also applies, for the time being, to the Islamic State group and affiliated groups.

Indeed, the Wall Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice denies recognition to groups organizing a state that wantonly and openly violate IHL and IHRL.

6. In practice, terrorist groups are often prosecuted for common crimes under domestic law in various jurisdictions.

7. In fact, no other state in the world — not even any Islamic one –has recognized ISIS/ISL as a legitimate political group engaged in a non-international armed conflict or a war for national liberation. Yet admittedly, there is vigorous debate on the continuing relevance of the general rule just mentioned, given the many acts tantamount to war crimes being committed by ISIS and its affiliated groups around the world. It remains to be seen whether the status/act distinction can be extended such that terror groups may be prosecuted for war crimes under IHL but remain classified as terror groups. What ‘s at stake is nothing less than the viability of civilizational norms. Taking off from the ICRC paper, a relevant question is whether the ISIS affiliates in the Philippines such as the Abu Sayaff and the Maute Group have at least achieved such an organized status as being able to meet the threshold for waging a non-international armed conflict. It is worth noting that previous to Marawi, the government has treated these two groups as groups merely engaged in criminality.

8. However, in Lagman v. Medialdea, the Philippine Supreme Court elevated the ISIS-allied Maute group to a political group by agreeing with the Executive Department’s contention that they are a group that has launched a rebellion to establish an Islamic state in Marawi City. The question of course is whether this also means characterizing the rebellion as a non-international armed conflict. Associate Justice Leonen also pointed to this apparent incongruence in his dissent to the majority opinion with these two trenchant paragraphs:

Elevating the acts of a lawless criminal group which uses terrorism as tactic to the constitutional concept of rebellion acknowledges them as a political group. Rebellion is a political crime. We have acknowledged that if rebels are able to capture government, their rebellion, no matter how brutal, will be justified. Also, by acknowledging them as rebels, we elevate their inhuman barbarism as an “armed conflict of a non-international character” protected by International Humanitarian Law. We will be known worldwide as the only country that acknowledges them, not as criminals, but as rebels entitled to protection under international law.

9.  The next question is whether characterizing the siege of Marawi as an NIAC could mean the reverse; that is, also granting the Mautes legitimacy as a group with political aims.

(This is a slightly different version of a post I made on my Facebook account. Photo credit, Abante Tonite).

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The Kings Two Bodies, E. Kantorowicz’s Political Theology

Thoughts thus far after having intermittently read 300 + pages of E. Kantorowicz’s TKTB:

1. Political theology is understanding how theological concepts are de-sacralized and then re-sacralized in an analogous/analogical sense (not the Thomist kind, mind you!) by politics and/or the study of statecraft.

2. Political theology is NOT public theology as it is popularized today.

3. One can really sense E. Kantorowicz engage Carl Schmitt here as a conversation partner (well, not in the literal sense, since they weren’t contemporaries). Having read Schmitt ahead of E. Kantorowicz eight years ago, the infamous Nazi constitutional theorist makes more sense to me now. I also understand Dutertismo better, seen from the lenses provided by E. Kantorowicz, Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben (ha!)

4. Reading through E. Kantorowicz’s chapters on the Christ-Centered Kingship, the Law-Centered Kingship and the Polity-Centered Kingship: Corpus Mysticum, I can argue from Dooyeweerdian eyes that what he discusses in these chapters is really what we mean by disciplinary differentiation, if in a rough way. Thus:

Ch. 1: the phrase ‘body politic’ often used by later philosophers (Locke and Hobbes, for instance) apparently finds root in the metaphysical theory of the King’s two bodies familiar to Tudor jurists — the indivisible body natural and the body politic. The theory itself developed out of the Christian doctrine of the incarnation of Christ and the Athanasian two natures. The King is dead, long live the King!

Ch 2. Shakespeare’s King Richard II illustrates the tensions and breakdowns of the theory in a subversive era.

Ch 3. In the Norman tracts, the theory gets further traction, the King becoming, as it were, an imitation of Christ on earth, under the notion of germina persona (something like the Lord President today who could do no wrong for that reason!). It is a liturgical kingship, the earthly ruler as christomimetes, the impersonator and actor of christ no less than priest or bishop celebrating the Eucharist.

Ch. 4 It gets more interesting for lawyers like me — the ground now shifts from liturgy to law, as the King becomes the epitome of equity and justice (as the canon lawyers take over, with their familiarity with Roman and ecclessiastical law). Thus the maxim the King is above the law, but is neverthless servant of the Law. The terms necessarily change –it is now a discussion between privata voluntas and persona publica (or private will as against public person).

Frederick II is its poster boy.

So this secularization is to be taken mostly in a positive sense, also pace Casanova (secularization as societal differentiation, marking out distinct boundaries for each sphere that is sovereign in its own orbit (Kuyper’s sovereignteit in eigen kring). So theologians shouldn’t take it out on jurists/political scientists/philosophers if their ideas were used by the latter in ways different from theirs. Also, they really shouldn’t wish things were back to the time when theology was the Queen of the Sciences.

5. This is what we otherwise understand to be the analogical moments that Dooyeweerd speaks of in the formation of disciplinary concepts as the various spheres open up in the process of societal differentiation (disciplines borrow from other disciplines in forming concepts, without transgressing the integrity of their own disciplinary concerns).

6. If we follow E. Kantorowicz (who was an atheist, by the way) –and now that we’re marking the 500th year of the Protestant Reformation — there’s not much to the often-repeated thesis that modernity (read as BAD secularization) is the fault of Protestants. Well, he does mention the nominalists here, but only in a very tangential way (take that, Milbank et al.) You can blame Dante for that. Or Marselius de Padua, or the Roman jurists. Or Frederick II. Or Paul of Tarsus. Take your pick.  Heck, Roman Catholicism could very well have bred the seeds of secularization, if we follow Kantorowicz’s account! (For an alternative reading of secularization in the BAD sense, see Dooyeweerd’s essay on the Secularization of Science).

7. I wish this book were one of the assigned texts, along with Harold Berman’s  two volumes on the development of law in the Western tradition, when I was reading legal history in law school.

(Nota bene: This is a slightly revised version of a post I earlier made on my Facebook account).

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Filed under Casanova, Dooyeweerd, Kantorowicz, Politics, reformational philosophy, Religion, secularization