Category Archives: Human Rights

The “public interest” and its (mis)use throughout history

 

Politicians, courts and activists invoke the “public interest” at the drop of a hat, the better to marshall it in support of a favored doctrine or project. But consider this:

For the sake of the public interest Plato and Fichte defended the withdrawal of the children from their parents and wanted their education to be entrusted to the body politic. With an appeal to the public interest Plato wanted to abolish marriage and private property as far as the ruling classes of his ideal State were concerned. Aristotle wanted education to be made uniform in ‘the public interest’; on the same ground Rousseau wished to destroy all the particular associations intervening between the State and the individual citizen. Wolff desired the body politic to meddle with everything human and, at least for the Protestant Churches, he wanted the government to fix the confession.

The idea of the ‘salus publica’ was the hidden dynamite under the Humanistic natural law theories of Hugo Grotius and S. Pufendorff. In Chr. Wolff’s doctrine of natural law this idea resulted in a frankly admitted antinomy with his theory of innate natural rights. The slogan of the public interest was the instrument for the destruction of the most firmly established liberties because it lacked any juridical delimitation. The terrible threat of Leviathan is audible in this word as long as it is used in a juridically unlimited sense. The universalistic political theories could conceive of the relation between the State and the non-political societal structures only in the schema of the whole and its parts. This is why they could not delimit the idea of ‘the public interest’.
(“Dooyeweerd 1997–III: pp. 442–443)

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Republic’s Interregnum: Legal Lacunae in the State of Exception

Going over Republic v. Sandiganbayan’s ponencia by J. Carpio in class last night, I was struck by the abnormal situation it had to cope with and the way in which the Court dealt with it. For one, we have to realize that the 1987 Charter is a constitution that expressly carves out a state of exception for a series of acts committed by the revolutionary government — through Jovito Salonga no less! –in the constitutional interregnum.

The interregnum was our Schmittian moment in a deeply paradoxical way: we ousted the martial law regime but resorted to some of its tactics to make sure the political gains already won will not be lost again. Indeed, in the 1987 Charter, we have a constitution that expressly sanctions unconstitutional acts committed in the space of the interregnum s when there was no operative constitution!

Section 26, Article XVIII,  states:

SECTION 26. The authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 in relation to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth shall remain operative for not more than eighteen months after the ratification of this Constitution. However, in the national interest, as certified by the President, the Congress may extend said period.

A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only upon showing of a prima facie case. The order and the list of the sequestered or frozen properties shall forthwith be registered with the proper court. For orders issued before the ratification of this Constitution, the corresponding judicial action or proceeding shall be filed within six months from its ratification. For those issued after such ratification, the judicial action or proceeding shall be commenced within six months from the issuance thereof.

The sequestration or freeze order is deemed automatically lifted if no judicial action or proceeding is commenced as herein provided.

As it were, it co-exists happily with Art. III, the Bill of Rights.

Second, the way in which J. Carpio directly applied international law into a domestic question of unreasonable search and seizure, purportedly because there was no Bill of Rights to speak of, with the throwing out of the 1973 Marcos constitution by the People Power Revolution.

It’s as if –among other things — nearly nine decades of jurisprudence laying down due process protections did not exist, the doctrine of stare decisis ceased to apply,  and Art. 8 of the Civil Code also went out the window along with the 1973 Constitution. Dean Magallona’s critique of this decision was spot on, if only it wasn’t cryptic in parts. Nevertheless, that offending clause in the 1987 Charter is more Agamben than Schmitt to me.

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Filed under Human Rights, Impunity, International Law, martial law, Philippines, Public Interest, State, Tyranny

Aquinas on Tyrants and Tyrannicide

periander_vat2Aquinas’ De regno ad regem Cypiri (Address to the King of Cyprus, circa 13th C.) : interesting to read this short work written by Thomas Aquinas, especially the section on tyrants and tyrannicide, which I find to be a fertile source for contemporary political thought and discussion. A special note to make is that for Aquinas, a monarchy is the best political arrangement, hence the discussion is centered on the king.

Aquinas is reluctant to endorse private ventures to kill a tyrant; at the most, he appears to allow an uprising led by public authority as a last resort (I suppose, to give it a cloak of legality). Calvin follows this line, as do the Dutch Calvinists (for example, getting William of Orange to lead against Spanish tyranny), but I am not sure if Calvin et al acknowledge Aquinas as their source for their position.

Too, one thinks of the failed attempt to assassinate Hitler that was joined by the Lutheran theologian Diectrich Bonhoeffer, which seems to meet Aquinas’ requirement, as it was hatched by a small group that involved military officers and a couple of civil servants, who thus might qualify as public authorities. Yet Aquinas gives sufficient caution against such an adventurism, citing Roman examples when the ouster of a tyrant led to worse tyrannies. (Think of Pol Pot too!)

He also appears to provide a basis for later social contract theories here: ” If to provide itself with a king belongs to the right of a given multitude, it is not unjust that the king be deposed or have his power restricted by that same multitude if, becoming a tyrant, he abuses the royal power. It must not be thought that such a multitude is acting unfaithfully in deposing the tyrant, even though it had previously subjected itself to him in perpetuity, because he himself has deserved that the covenant with his subjects should not be kept, since, in ruling the multitude, he did not act faithfully as the office of a king demands.”

As earlier stated, Calvin and the Dutch Calvinists appear to echo this Thomist idea of revolt led by public authority; The English Puritans also argue that the governed have the right to revolt against unjust leaders. The American revolutionaries who rose up against the British re-state the same idea, by way of the English social contractarians, notably John Locke.

Ideas have legs, indeed? (Also serves to show Ecclessiastes is right — there is nothing new under the sun. Human nature, being what it is, often falls victim to the same weaknesses and bad habits). Hence the relevance of the battle cry — ad fontes!

Finally, Aquinas allows that tyrants may have been allowed by God to rise to power as punishment for the sins of the people. Now we Filipinos should start asking ourselves whether the present darkness is a punishment or a reward.

 

(photo of the Tyrant Periander of Corinth’s  source)

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The UDHR and the Ontology of Rights

 

UDHRMore than 60 years after its founding, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) remains a document relevant to contemporary issues and problems; Perhaps, its genius lies in the fact that it is a declaration that embodies a broad sweep of the world’s varied traditions, philosophies and perspectives, so that no single bloc can claim ownership over its “sacred truths,” to use a theological term in this highly secularized era of ours.

Perhaps too, it can well be said that their commonality lies in the sureness of their being profoundly human. And while critics may rightly point to how its more influential interpreters often offer to the world a lopsided bent towards the individualistic view of human rights, as a founding document, its relevance is measured by the willingness of its adherents to a reasoned dialogue about the differences and commonalities that characterize various interpretive traditions.

Of course, ontological issues cannot be summarily set swept aside. (Indeed, the Western tradition presses on the primacy of the individual as the supreme if not the only ontological truth there is).

But that precisely is the role of reasoned dialogue: to show which interpretative strategy is better able to explain the problems and the solutions to them. Hence how can we better account for the so-called collective/group rights other than a resort to the positivist predilection for the description of the what is (and its undisguised disdain for the teleological)?

This discussion is also crucial to an understanding of the rise of non-state actors in international law. Is the sociological account (as for example, the process view of Higgins) enough to convince us that original objective legal personality must now be seen as something that transcends the state.

Indeed, much of theorizing on the state has been influenced by a philosophical movement that either exalts the state as the only political reality or treats it as a legal fiction of the social contract between among purportedly free and autonomous individuals.

International legal theory takes it for granted that there is an opposition between the individual and the state, to the exclusion of all other non-state actors. International legal theory thus confronts us with a nominalism of the state as the only true sovereign and a nominalism of individuals as the basic elements of the international legal order.

Hence, international law theorists resort to an unsatisfactory strategy of (1) devising external limits to the powers of the state or (2) stressing the primacy of the individual over all else to curtail abuse of state power. This nominalistic approach has so dominated international law that for the most part, the state has been seen as the only source of legal standing and legal personality in the international arena.

The first strategy cannot fully account for the state’s public and private duties while the second strategy fails to do justice to the proper exercise of the same duties as well as to the existence of other non-state entities, such as civil society groups, churches and multinational corporations.

This in fact leads to an irresolvable conflict between the state and the individual, inasmuch as it fails to properly recognize their respective competencies, as well as the existence of other spheres in society.

Neither of the two strategies can properly account for the rise of non-state actors in international legal discourse, other than resorting to notions of democratic participation and legitimacy that in the first place do not provide a convincing ontological justification for why non-state actors should be granted the right to democratic participation and the power to ascribe legitimacy to international legal processes.

As Jeremy Sarkin has persuasively argued, there is a “clear position from 1948,” when the UNDHR was adopted, that the instrument demands that “every individual and every organ of society … promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance.”

From this standpoint, although “companies may not be in the habit of referring to themselves as ‘organs of society,’ they are a fundamental part of society. As such, they have a moral and social obligation to respect the universal rights enshrined in the Declaration.”[1]

Yet his observation also begs to ask the question thus: is this merely a matter of opinio juris and state practice, or something that requires a radical and fundamental ontological commitment? Of course, we all know that even the positivist position is anchored on an unstated ontological commitment, that is, one that thinks lightly of ontology, if at all.

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On the occasion of International Human Rights Day, Dec. 10, 2015

[1]Jeremy Sarkin, The Coming of Age of Claims for Reparations for Human Rights Violations in the South, 1 SUR INT’L J OF HUM. RIGHTS 67, 69-70 (2004)

 

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The Cebu Declaration for Free Expression in Southeast Asia

CebuDeclarationLawyers from five countries in Southeast Asia have met in an historic conference in Cebu, Philippines to form a common front against the repression of freedom of expression in the region.

One of their key proposals is to engage together and hold accountable regional institutions like the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights – an organization, they say, remains unresponsive to human rights violations in member countries.

More than 30 lawyers, representing 10 civil society organizations from Thailand, Malaysia, Myanmar, Indonesia and the Philippines established Sunday the Advocates for Freedom of Expression Coalition-Southeast Asia (AFEC-SEA) and vowed to “raise a Southeast Asian voice that will champion freedom of expression in our region in accordance with international human rights norms as exercised by journalists, bloggers, netizens, citizens and human rights defenders, in whatever medium, form, or frontier, whether traditional or emerging.”

“A violation of the right to freedom of expression in one Southeast Asian nation is a matter of grave concern to the whole region,” they said in a document signed over the weekend during the four-day conference in Mactan, Cebu. “The protection of freedom of expression is an obligation of the whole region under international law.”

Most of the signatories are trial lawyers who have handled cases against freedom of expression and Internet freedom. Some – including senior lawyers from Myanmar – had been jailed for fighting against human rights violations or for advocating freedom of expression.

“Recent events have posed and continue to pose serious threats to freedom of expression in Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, and the rest of Southeast Asia,” the declaration said, signed by the Center for International Law Philippines (CenterLaw), Persatuan Kesedaran Komuniti Selangor (EMPOWER), Institute for Criminal Justice Reform (ICJR), iLaw, The Legal Aid Center for the Press (LBH Pers), Malaysian Centre for Constitutionalism & Human Rights (MCCHR), Myanmar Lawyers’ Network (MLN), Myanmar Media Lawyers’ Network (MMLN), Philippine Internet Freedom Alliance (PIFA), and the Thai Lawyers For Human Rights (TLHR).

The conference was organized by Centerlaw with the support of the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative Internet Freedom program.

“(I)n establishing this freedom of expression collation, our vision is to achieve a Southeast Asia that upholds and protects freedom of expression, and the rule of law, serving as a beacon of free speech to the world,” the declaration added.

“It is an opportune time for us to issue this declaration given the escalating repression of expression in the region, including restrictions on the use of the Internet,” said Romel Bagares, CenterLaw executive director.

He said the lawyers realize that for the most part, they are fighting an uphill battle in countries like Thailand, Myanmar and even Malaysia. “But it is important that cases are filed to have an historical record of wrongs brought to court.”

Among the projects coalition members will undertake is a campaign against the use of a single gateway for the Internet in Thailand, legal challenges against the use of the 1948 Sedition Act in Malaysia to repress protests against the government, and the filing of cases in the Philippines against recently-issued government regulations on the Cybercrime Act, according to Gilbert Andres, a Centerlaw senior litigator who played a key role in bringing the lawyers together to the conference.

“The lawyers have also agreed that the Asean Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights needs to be challenged and engaged to play an active role in the promotion and protection of free expression,” said Andres.

Delegates from Myanmar also highlighted their “Yellow Ribbon campaing” for judicial independence in their country in the wake of the appointment by the government of senior military officials to their Supreme Court. “Free expression is stifled when the courts are filled with generals who repress dissent the first time they see it,” said Aung Soe, a veteran lawyer who represented the Myanmar Media Lawyers Network and the Myanmar Lawyers Network, two largest lawyers’ groups in his country .

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Cebu Declaration  on the  Right to Freedom of Expression as a Fundamental Human Right  and its importance to the Southeast Asia region

WHEREAS, we are non-governmental organizations in Southeast Asia working for the protection and promotion of human rights, especially for the right to freedom of expression;

WHEREAS, recent events have posed and continue to pose serious threats to freedom of expression in Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, and the rest of Southeast Asia;

WHEREAS, we see an urgent need in Southeast Asia to utilize remedies under domestic and international law against these threats to freedom of expression, for we want to establish an edifice for free expression that will serve not only this generation but the future generations of Southeast Asians;

THEREFORE:

WE DECLARE that the right to freedom of expression is essential in the pursuit of truth, justice, equality, and accountability; but more importantly, freedom of expression is a fundamental human right since as human beings we yearn to express our own humanity.

WE DECLARE that in order to animate our core belief in the right to freedom of expression as a fundamental human right, our individual members shall commit not to prosecute criminal cases against anyone for something he or she expresses except in accordance with international human rights norms, and shall advocate for the repeal of criminal libel laws.

WE DECLARE that the right to freedom of expression is universal, but that the methods for its advocacy and protection are contextual; hence, we shall raise a Southeast Asian voice that will champion freedom of expression in our region in accordance with international human rights norms as exercised by journalists, bloggers, netizens, citizens and human rights defenders, in whatever medium, form, or frontier, whether traditional or emerging.

 WE DECLARE that the economic and social integration of Southeast Asia requires the respect and protection of freedom of expression in our region consistent with international human rights norms. Freedom of expression cannot be bargained for purely economic, social or political considerations. Moreover, a violation of the right to freedom of expression in one Southeast Asian nation is a matter of grave concern to the whole region; the protection of freedom of expression is an obligation of the whole region under international law.

WE DECLARE that the rule of law, equality, non-discrimination, access to justice and fair trial are essential to the protection and promotion of freedom of expression.

WE DECLARE that to be more effective advocates for freedom of expression and the rule of law in Southeast Asia, we resolve to work together in unity of purpose, action, spirit and passion, and WE THEREFORE ESTABLISH the Advocates for freedom of expression Coalition-Southeast Asia to advance freedom of expression across Southeast Asia consistent with international human rights norms, through strategic litigation, education, training and advocacy.

LASTLY, WE DECLARE that in establishing this freedom of expression coalition, our vision is to achieve a Southeast Asia that upholds and protects freedom of expression, and the rule of law, serving as a beacon of free speech to the world.

Signed this 27th day of September 2015, in Lapu-Lapu City, Mactan Island, Cebu, Philippines, by our duly authorized representatives

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Filed under Burma, Free Expression, Human Rights, International Law, Internet, Libel, Malaysia, Thailand, Uncategorized

Philippines should take Indonesia to ICJ re #MaryJaneVeloso case

Mary Jane Veloso is a Filipina who was allegedly conscripted by an international syndicate to smuggle drugs into Indonesia as a “drug mule.” She was arrested at the airport and subsequently tried and found guilty by an Indonesia court for drug trafficking. She was sentenced to death. The 72-hour countdown to her execution is well on its way, and will end when she faces a firing squad tomorrow, Tuesday, at 5 pm. A second, last-ditch appeal filed by lawyers on her behalf has just been denied.

With the denial of this second appeal, we at the Center for International Law believe it  is now possible for the Philippines to consider an international remedy available to it.  In fact, there is still time for the Philippines to take Indonesia to the International Court of Justice on the capital punishment case, following precedents in the La Gran11173378_10153896807533298_1132289177278974993_nd (Gemany v. US, 2001) and Avena (Mexico v. US 2004) cases. The Philippines can ask the World Court for a provisional order to stay the execution, as Germany did in La Grand just hours before the scheduled execution in Arizona, which by the way, was granted by the ICJ. We have got nothing to lose by exploring this option. This should not be taken as mutually exclusive of diplomatic avenues.

I was interviewed on this issue this afternoon by CNN Philippines reporter David Yu Santos. And that is exactly what I pointed out to him. But the question is, will the Philippine government take up this option?

 

 

 

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Filipino human rights group brings case of detained Thai poet to UN body

ThailandThe Manila-based free expression advocacy group Center for International Law asked the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Wednesday to press the Thai Royal Government to free a Thai poet and blogger being tried by a military tribunal for writing articles that allegedly insulted King Bhumibol Aduljadej.

The cyberactivist, the poet Sirapop Korn-A-Rut, has been detained at the Bangkok Remand prison since June 2014 and faces up to 45 years in prison under his country’s restrictive lèse majesté laws, or laws penalizing any publication deemed offensive to the Thai King.

“Sirapop has written about a wide range of issues dealing with the contemporary political and legal climate in his country, a brave act that cannot be honestly done without dealing with the institution of the Office of the King of Thailand,” said lawyers Harry Roque and Romel Regalado Bagares, chair and executive director, respectively, of CenterLaw. “In doing so, he has run afoul of the lese-majesté laws of the Kingdom of Thailand, which he has also considered to be a long-standing instrument of political repression and oppression in his country.”

The Thai cyberactivist, whose situation was brought to Centerlaw’s attention by the Thai internet freedom group Internet Law Reform Dialogue (iLaw), is accused of publishing several allegedly libelous poems online against the Thai King sometime between November 7, 2009 and June 30, 2014 under the pseudonym “Rungsira.” One poem (Shut the news, closing the eyes, buffalos are tearful, because the tiger may die) Pid-khao-bod-khloa, Kra-bu-ram-hai, Duay-wa, Pa-yak-ka-jak- ka-wai, was posted on the web board of the“Prachathai” website (www.prachataiwebboard.com).

This carried a caricature of an crowned old man with a Swastika on his military uniform sleeve accompanied by the text “…being an angel, why does one have to walk on the soil, overlook the ground surface, even if having normal food every meal, being modest, because we are faithful, with two hands we build up ourselves…”

The same caricature with the text “Prince Baworndesh the head of the rebels, Din Tarab the army leader of the rebel, Sulayut Julanon the Grandson of the rebels, the Angel the King of the rebels, Suthep Thaugsuban the Southern rebel, Sondhi Limthongkul the Chinese rebel,” also appeared on his blog (http://rungsira.blogspot.com/2014/01/blog-post-22.hlml). All of these were purportedly placed and made available online by Sirapop during Martial Law in Thailand.

The human rights group Amnesty International reports that around 511 activists, students, academicians and journalists have been arrested and arbitrarily detained, in violation of their rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, since Martial Law was declared in the country last May 20, 2014.

Authorities have used security legislations and lese-majesté laws to suppress even peaceful dissenters to such extents that enforced disappearances, torture and inhumane treatment were carried out, prosecutions of criminalized political activities were hastily made, media was bullied into silence and self-censorship, and human rights safety mechanisms were set aside.

In their 16-page petition to the Working Group, the Filipino lawyers said Sirapop is clearly being arbitrary held and tried simply because he has chosen to exercise his right to free expression and to participate in public affairs in his country, which rights are protected under international law, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, of which Thailand is a party. The Thai cyberactivist is also being denied his right to a fair trial, according to the petition.

The UNWAD is a specialized UN human rights mechanism dealing with urgent cases of arbitrary detention any where in the world. While its rulings are non-binding, these are considered authoritative on the state of international law dealing with fundamental human rights. Over the years, its interventions in the situation of many human rights activists in repressive states have yielded positive results.

Centerlaw cited a view issued by the UN Human Rights Committee in the case of jailed Filipino broadcast journalist Alexander Adonis, which Centerlaw had brought before the Committee. “In its view in the Adonis case the UNHRC said that criminal libel is incompatible with the freedom of expression protected under Art 19 of the ICCPR,” it said in its Petition filed on behalf of Sirapop.

Thailand’s ruling military junta has scrapped the country’s old Constitution and replaced it with an interim charter that denied the right of appeal to citizens convicted of violating its lese-majesté laws. As in Sirapop’s case, it has increasingly used military courts to prosecute alleged offenders without a public trial. Centerlaw argues that thailand’s military tribunals are not independent of the Executive and the lack of an appeal removes any possibility of a remedy against its judgments.

*image from http://www.stopmakingsense.org

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